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ABSTRACT
The Bennett Freeze was established in 1966 and imposed for 40 years on 1.5 million acres of
land within the boundaries of the Western Agency of the Navajo Nation. Bennett Freeze came as
a result of the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute. The “freeze” halted all construction, development,
and improvements made to enhance the quality of life within the boundaries of the Bennett
Freeze area. Public works were included in the restrictions created by the freeze, which
effectively denied residents access to basic sanitation facilities. There are approximately 2,685+
homes (~20,000 residents) within the Former Bennett Freeze Area (FBFA) without access to safe
drinking water or basic sanitation facilities. The purpose of this research is to assess where
waterline developments and extensions in the FBFA will make the most significant impacts on
the residents’ quality of life. The assessment of this research will be done using Elinor Ostrom’s
Eight Design Principles for Commons Management. In this analysis the design principles will be
known as Ostrom’s Eight Collective-choice Design Principles for Resource Management. The
desired outcome of this research is to use institutional analysis to improve our understanding of
managing a collective choice problem, and help pursue water resource solutions, and prosperity
back into the FBFA.
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INTRODUCTION
Over 50 years ago in 1966 the Department of Interior Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Robert Bennett established a moratorium on all development on a portion of the Hopi and
Navajo Indian Reservations. The moratorium became known as the “Bennett Freeze” and was
created to negotiate land disputes between the Hopi and Navajo tribes. The Bennett Freeze did
not produce positive negotiation outcomes between the tribes; rather it had the opposite effect.
As a result of the moratorium on all development in the Bennett Freeze, the area became an area
of disarray.
In 2009, the moratorium was lifted, and the Bennett Freeze became known as the Former
Bennett Freeze Area (FBFA). For over 40 years (1966-2009) the FBFA had not seen new
development. After 2009 the FBFA has become a focal point for improved economic growth
and development. Following the lifting of the moratorium, federal and tribal budgets had funds
set aside for the rehabilitation of the FBFA. Water and electricity were two of the top selling
points for obtaining dollars to rehabilitate the FBFA 1.5 million-acre area. However, in the
discussion of economic growth and development for the FBFA, water resources development
remains left out of the discussion.
The general purpose of this research is to assess the water resource development issues of
the FBFA. The focus is on establishing where waterline developments and extensions in the
FBFA could make the most significant impacts on the residents’ quality of life, and what kind of
institutional barriers may need to be overcome. The assessment of this research will be done
using Elinor Ostrom’s Eight Design Principles for Commons Management (Ostrom, Dietz, and
Stern, 2003). An institutional analysis using Ostrom’s eight design principles will be applied to
the FBFA. The FBFA is an example of a collective action dilemma, which will require a robust
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local institutional solution. The question is how can movement towards creating and sustaining
institutions capable of collectively managing water resources in the FBFA, e.g., following
Ostrom’s design principles.

HISTORY & BACKGROUND
Historical Review
Over nearly the course of six centuries, the population at Chaco Canyon grew as
described in the book, Collapse (Diamond, 2005).1 As the population grew so did their demands.
These demands dealt with food resources, water resources, biological resources, and any other
resources that might have been needed, coming from the environment. The experience of Chaco
Canyon can be likened unto the Tragedy of the Commons, in that, the population drew near the
area of which the environment could no longer support. Today, with an ever-increasing
population and associated demands, inhabitants continuously are faced with the issue of
environmental management and survival.
Like the historical account of Chaco Canyon being influenced by the management of
common resources, it is not unusual to find groups of people who face the same issues
presently.2 Most often natural resources and land create division (Dietz, 2003). For many
decades two tribes in the state of Arizona have been in dispute over land and establishing their

1

The discussion of Chaco Canyon in Collapse displays the ancient relationship of a group of
people and the environment that relied on a certain area of land that could no longer support the
population. Thus, leading to a collapse of a developing society. Much like was experienced in
the Former Bennett Freeze Area, where a third party implementation management legislation of
land and resources was enforced.
2
The commons is a resource that numerous users have access to which they cannot be prohibited
from. A frequent example of a common resource is the access people have to land to graze
animals. In the case of water resources, a common resource is the access people have to ground
water via wells (Fleck, 2016).
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rights to govern and develop. The Navajo and Hopi tribes have been in legal dispute over land
since the late 1800s (Benally, 2011).
With the creation of American Indian reservations, Indigenous tribes such as the Navajo
and Hopi were confined to areas much smaller than their traditional roaming grounds (Figure 1).
The establishment of reservation boundaries that limited the Hopi and Navajo created
impracticalities of sharing title to the land (Benedek, 1992; Brugge, 1994). Since the Navajo
tribe entered into an agreement with the United States government by way of the Treaty of 1868,
the Hopi and Navajo have been recorded to be in dispute over land rights (Kammer, 1980). By
the year 1934 more land tracts had been added to the Navajo Nation. The 1934 addition to the
Navajo Nation ultimately led to further significant land disputes with the Hopi tribe (Weinstein,
2001).
By 1966 the disputes over land and resources between the Hopi and Navajo had not
dissipated and became an issue the Department of Interior (DOI). DOI Commissioner of Indian
Affairs Robert Bennett sought to address these disputes through imposing a "mutual consent"
requirement (Kammer, 1980). The “mutual consent” would be for undertaking development
projects within the boundaries of the 1934 reservation boundaries of the Navajo Nation. This
"mutual consent" became known as the Bennett Freeze area (Figure 3).
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Figure 1. Location of Hopi and Navajo Nation Reservations.
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Figure 2. Navajo Nation Boundaries that were apart of the FBFA.

Figure 3. The Former Bennett Freeze Area created through the 1966 “mutual agreement” requirement
between the Navajo and Hopi Tribes.
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The original goal of the Bennett Freeze was to facilitate negotiation efforts between the
Hopi and Navajo tribes to settle land disputes (Brugge, 1994). However, the imposition of the
Bennett Freeze created more problems between the tribes and their development progress. By
1980 the impacts of the Bennett Freeze had substantially broadened, adding restrictions and
stopping any construction within the boundaries of the Bennett Freeze area (Weinstein, 2001).
The new 1980 restrictions included public works. Today, the effects of the Bennett Freeze
throughout 40 years can still be seen on the Hopi and Navajo tribal lands.
The Bennett Freeze restrictions stopping construction of or rehabilitation of public works
denied residents living in the area access to basic sanitation facilities. The Bennett Freeze
continued until 2009 when President Barack Obama formally signed a law repealing the Bennett
Freeze, section 10(f) of Public Law 93-531. According to the United States 2010 Census there
are approximately 2,685+ homes in the Former Bennett Freeze area without access to safe
drinking water or basic sanitation, affecting approximately the lives of 20,000 residents (Figure
2).
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Figure 4. Homes on the Navajo Nation without access to Basic Sanitation Facilities.

Water Rights
The foundation of Indian Water Rights is found within the Supreme Court decision in the
Winters v. United States case. Winters v. the United States involves the Fort Belknap American
Indian Reservation located in Montana. The major finding of the case was that water rights for
American Indian Reservations are implied with the establishment of the reservation, meaning
that the date of the establishment of the reservation also serves as the date for when the
reservation’s water was appropriated (Canby, 2009). The appropriation of water helps with the
disputes that form between multiple parties.
Water disputes occur wherever the water is scarce. The water resources available to the
human population is finite. The growth of the human population and the changes involving
climate change are significant factors that affect both the current and future balances of water
security greatly. In the western states of the United States, water is a scarce resource. The
western states also are highly concentrated with American Indian reservations, which, by default
takes the brunt of the disputes involving Indian Water Rights.
The FBFA is no different when discussion of water disputes arise. Water rights fall under
two main categorical systems: riparian and appropriative (Canby, 2009). The FBFA falls under
the appropriative water rights system. The appropriative system includes prior appropriation for
the distribution of water. Prior appropriation operates under the notion of, “first in time, first in
right” as well as, “use it or lose it.” Under the appropriative system, the water must be
appropriated for beneficial use.
The FBFA made a substantial impact on water supply negotiations, creating sensitive
political issues. Thus, it may come as little surprise that Arizona Senator McCain and Utah
Senator Kyl introduced legislation to repeal section 10(f) of Public Law 93-531 in 2009. Public
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Law 93-531 is also known as the “Bennett Freeze.” That year in 2009, 10(f) of Public Law 93531 was repealed, which started the process to unthaw the Bennett Freeze and opened up
development opportunities. Three years later in 2012, Senator McCain and Senator Kyl moved
to introduce the S.2109 - Navajo-Hopi Little Colorado River Water Rights Settlement Act of
2012. S. 2109 submitted plans to develop groundwater projects. The tribes were asked in S.
2109 to accept the title of the developments and ultimately take on the cost of operation,
maintenance, and replacements.3 In S. 2109 water rights for the Navajo and Hopi would be
waived to a certain degree, and releases of specified claims provided for the Federal Government
from the Hopi and Navajo Nations were also a part of the settlement.4 The goal of delivering
water to other parts of the state was also included in the settlement. A major public outcry
followed the Navajo-Hopi Little Colorado River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2012, which
resulted in a split tribal government approval to not move forward with the legislation. S. 2109
was introduced to Congress in 2012 but was not enacted.

3

The title of developments discussed in S. 2109 were about two groundwater projects designed
to transfer water to communities on the Navajo Nation (S. 2109, 2012). The two projects were
the Leupp-Dilkon and Ganado. Leupp Chapter is one of the nine chapters located in the FBFA.
4
The limitation of water rights specifically addressed in S. 2019 was for the lands taken into
trust for the Navajo and Hopi Tribes. Limitation of water rights was interpreted to limiting
historical water rights that were established for the tribes’ senior water rights in exchange for
those discussed in the 2012 Act.
Professional Project

17

Nikki Tulley

Professional Project

18

Nikki Tulley

Figure 5. Navajo Nation Proposed Regional Water Supply Projects

Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute
Migrations of people over a territory often leads to conflict such is the case between the
Navajo and Hopi people. As early as the year 1819 the Spanish had documentation of the Hopi
asking for help in removing Navajo settlers away from their villages due to trouble over land
(Weinstein, 2001). The Spanish agreed to help the Hopi move the Navajo. Thus, an exchange
was created between Navajo, Hopi, and Spanish that overlapped in displacing one group or
another. By 1848 Mexico with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ceded lands of the Navajo and
Hopi to the United States (Kammer, 1980). After their last war with the United States, the
Navajo were exiled from 1863 to 1868 to Fort Sumner, New Mexico (Benally, 2011). Upon
entering into a treaty with the United States in 1868, the Navajo were given a small reservation
in their homeland to return to after leaving Fort Sumner.
The 1868 Navajo Reservation grew with the addition of two United States executive
orders. The 1882 Executive Order Reservation required that the Navajo and Hopi both share the
reservation. The requirement for the Navajo and Hopi to share the 1882 Executive Order
Reservation led to the two tribes seeking to establish their respective rights to land within the
reservation boundaries (Weinstein, 2001). The creation of joint-use reservation boundaries
through executive order did not last long. Six years later after the 1882 Executive Order, United
States troops came to assist with the removal of Navajo settlers due to Hopi complaints, although
the neither Navajo nor Hopi were uprooted from the shared reservation. The disputes over land
between the Navajo and Hopi did not stop here.
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Establishment of the Former Bennett Freeze Area
In 1934, the United States government sought to make an addition of acreage to the
Western Agency of the Navajo Reservation. The 234,000 acres of land to be added to the
Western Agency created more contention to the already entrenched Navajo-Hopi land disputes.
The Hopi tribe claimed that the intended acres to be added to Western Agency was land they
owned, stating that it was part of the 2.5 million acres of land set aside for the Hopi people in the
1882 Executive Order Reservation (Kammer, 1980).
After nearly thirty-two years of litigation between the Navajo and Hopi tribes, Hopi
sought to take the land rights to the 1934 addition to the Navajo Reservation. By 1966, the
dispute over land ownership of the Western Agency had not been resolved. As a result of this
unresolved dispute of the 1934 acreage addition in question, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
Robert Bennett ordered a “freeze.” The “freeze” that Commissioner Bennett imposed on the
Western Agency became known as the Bennett Freeze area. The Bennett Freeze included 1.5
million acres impacting the lives of approximately 12,000 Navajo residents (Weinstein, 2001).
Under the 1996 Bennett Freeze, any future development on the disputed land would require the
consent of both the Navajo and Hopi governments.
Commissioner Bennett’s intended mutual consent between the two tribes over
development within the Bennett Freeze area was unsuccessful. For roughly 40 years the Bennett
Freeze transformed with the addition of institutional rules and stakeholders (Table 1). The
transformation of the Bennett Freeze after 40 years had moved away from the original intention
of providing an arena for negotiation between the Navajo and Hopi.
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Ultimately, the Bennett Freeze through its transformation was written to include and halt
all construction and improvements including public works. By the time the Bennett Freeze was
officially lifted in 2009 nine chapters of the Navajo Nation had not been allowed to develop
(Figure 3). From the impacted Bennett Freeze resident population of approximately 12,000 in
1966, it has since grown to an estimated population of over 20,000 residents. Although the
freeze has been lifted for the FBFA, poverty and poor living conditions persist throughout the
Former Bennett Freeze Area.
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Table 1
Former Bennett Freeze event timeline
Chronology of Former Bennett Freeze Area
Important Events

Year
1868

Treaty of 1868 with the United States establishes the Navajo Indian Reservation.

1882

United States President Chester Arthur establishes the 1882 Reservation for Hopi and "Such other
Indians."

1934

Unreserved and non-appropriated public lands permanently withdrawn from the 1934 exterior
boundaries of the Navajo Nation. Some members of the Hopi Tribe were living on the 1934
boundary section of the Navajo Nation.

1966

Department of Interior Commissioner of Indian Affairs Robert Bennett, imposes a "mutual
consent" requirement for undertaking development projects in the boundaries of the 1934
reservation boundaries of the Navajo Nation. This "mutual consent" became known as the
Bennett Freeze area.

1972

With removal of Moenkopi, a Hopi Village that was in need of development, the modification
altered the fundamental balance of the Freeze (No more joint-tribe approval). Hopis to assume
defacto unilateral regulatory power over all development in the Freeze Area.

1974

Congress enacted 1974 Settlement Act, giving the tribes the right to bring suit against each other
for determining property rights in the section of the 1934 Navajo Nation Reservation boundaries.

1976

Commissioner of Indian Affairs Morris Thompson modifies the Bennett Freeze and his office
begins to grant lateral approval for Navajo requests, as oppose to having requests granted from the
Hopi and Navajo governments.

1980

Congress gets involved with the Bennett Freeze and substantially broadened the impacts on the
Navajo Nation. Hopis again have unilateral control over the Bennett Freeze. Added restrictions
halted any construction of improvements including Public Works.

1982

Hopis assume defacto moratorium on any and all construction activities in the Bennett Freeze.

1988

Congress passed amendment to the codified freeze to the Department of Interior to review Hopi
denials of Navajo Development.

1992

United District Court Judge Earl Caroll announced Bennett Freeze would be lifted.

1996

U.S. Congress passes Public Law 104-301 Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute Settlement Act.

2006

Signing of the Navajo-Hopi Intergovernmental Compact

2009

President Barack Obama signed a law repealing the Bennett Freeze section10(f) of Public Law
93-531.

2015

Navajo Renaissance, the collaborative effort of the nine Former Bennett Freeze Area chapters,
begins planning for development.
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Figure 6. Nine Navajo Nation Chapters within the Former Bennett Freeze Area.
Professional Project

23

Nikki Tulley

Due to the fact that the Former Bennett Freeze Area (FBFA) not only affected individuals
and families but also included public works and the access of residents to electricity and running
water, great interest remains on the Navajo Nation of how to best address improving the quality
of life after the freeze was lifted (Appendix A). The objective of this research is to assess where
waterline developments and extensions in the FBFA will make the greatest impacts on the
resident’s quality of life. The assessment will be done using Elinor Ostrom’s Eight Design
Principles for Commons Management. Since it is not quite a classic common pool problem, in
this analysis the design principles will be referred to as Ostrom’s Eight Collective-choice Design
Principles for Resource Management. Using this lens, the desired outcome better understand
how the FBFA might be more effectively governed since being thawed to improve people’s lives
and access to water.

METHODOLOGY
For this analysis of the FBFA, an institutional analysis framework will be used (Figure
4). The framework is broken down into seven sections and will help in understanding how rules
(both formal and informal) combine with the physical and cultural worlds that generate particular
types of situations that result in a collective-choice issue (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994;
Ostrom, 2011). Where an issue represents some set of unresolved problems to be addressed.
Ostrom’s work on collective-choice issues have been conducted with the intent to create
solutions to these common problems communities are faced with.
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Figure 7. Institutional Analysis Framework (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994).

Using the institutional analysis framework (Figure 4) for the FBFA’s polycentric political
system will create a streamlined approach to organizing the chaos of the collective-choice issue
about how to prioritize funding to get water to those areas who need it most. Attributes of the
physical world examine the current water resource development situation of the FBFA.
Attributes of the community examine the independent decision-making centers established in the
FBFA, looking at the tribal, chapter, and current residents. Rules-in-Use in the institutional
analysis framework provides an insight to what existing institutions –formal and informal rules –
currently liberate or constrain water resource decisions. Attributes of the physical world,
attributes of the community, and rules-in-use all combine or come together into the action arena.
Understanding the polycentric political system in the FBFA brings together the decision-making
centers working independently and develops an inter-dependent relationship system (Ostrom,
1961). Developing an Institutional Analysis Framework provides the general set up of factors
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contributing to collective-choice issues that arise from a coordination problem in the action
arena. In order to develop a more in-depth analysis of a collective-choice issue, levels of
analysis are created to understand how the attributes of the physical world, attributes of the
community, and rules-in-use create particular types of situations that come as a result of
coordination problems (Figure 5) (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994).

Figure 8. Levels of Analysis for an Institutional Approach (Ostrom, 1990).

The same action arena developed in the institutional analysis framework (Figure 4), is
then broken into a deeper level of analysis as the collective-choice rules and analysis (Figure 5),
which then is placed in the formal and informal collective-choice arenas (Figure 6). The three
rules that come with a deeper level of analysis are constitutional, collective-choice, and
operational.
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The collective-choice arenas establish the patterns of interactions on national, regional,
and local levels. Through the collective-choice patterns of interactions, a level of analysis
process is developed. The collective-choice process for the FBFA will look at policy-making
and management. The outcomes and evaluation criteria of the institutional analysis framework
will be demonstrated through the information collected using Ostrom’s Eight Collective-choice
Design Principles for Resource Management (Table 2). The analysis of a collective-choice issue
almost never results from a single action arena based on a single set of rules. Several action
arenas may exist when addressing coordination problems developed by collective-choice issues,
that are found in formal and informal collective-choice arenas that influence the operational rule
process (Figure 6).

Figure 9. Informal and Formal Collective-choice Arenas (Ostrom, 1990).

Professional Project

27

Nikki Tulley

Ostrom’s Governing of the Commons
Particular rules can lead to different outcomes when interacting with different attributes
in the physical world, community, economic, political and cultural views. Thus, no specific set
of rules can be used in this analysis. For this reason, the focus is design principles. The eight
design principles (Table 2) will be applied to take advantage of local resources and knowledge to
work for lasting sustainability. The eight design principles do not provide a set blueprint of how
to resolve collective-choice issues; rather they are used to increase the chance of successful
outcomes (Ostrom, Stern, & Dietz, 2003).

Table 2
Ostrom’s Eight Collective-choice Design Principles for Resource Management (Ostrom 1999,
2010, 2011).
1. Clearly define boundaries
 Boundaries are defined as those individuals who have access to resources.
 Boundaries are also defined for the resource itself (i.e. financial and natural
resources). The natural resource in this analysis is the access to water
resources.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
 Appropriation rules are tied to location to ensure sustainable resources remain.
 Provision rules indicate the timelines of labor for projects and the funding that
is required to meet the needs within the boundaries.
3. Collective-choice arrangements
 The arrangements to address the collective-choice issue can include
participation from all individuals, stakeholders and institutions identified in the
boundary. The diversity of thought will identify a solution to better fit the
issues faced by those in the boundaries.
4. Monitoring
 Monitoring is done for accountability of conditions and behaviors relating to
the collective-choice problem.
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5. Graduated sanctions
 Graduated sanctions are emplaced to ensure that the resource management
maintains order. If an operational rule not followed penalties will be enforced.
The goal of graduated sanctions is to increase the commitment within the
boundaries to comply with rules.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
 Rules must be clearly defined to ensure conflict-resolution is possible. The
discussion and resolving of issues need to have protocol to follow when rules
are not complied with.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize
 Limiting outside governmental authority influence on the way rules are
followed by individuals defined by the boundaries will give legitimacy to selfgovern rules. Giving legitimacy to self-govern rules will sustain rules designed
by individuals within the boundary.
8. Nested enterprises
 Includes all of the above activities that come together in multiple layers that are
organized into nested enterprises. The nested enterprises include:
appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and
governing activities.

The design principles are viewed as essential elements or condition that helps account for
the success of institutions in sustaining commons management resources and gaining the
compliance of multiple generations of appropriators to the rules in use (Ostrom, 2011). Through
applying these design principles, various actors in the FBFA will find ways to commit
themselves to conform themselves to operational rules in varying action arena systems. The
design principles (Table 2) and the 7 key challenges (Figure 8) diagnose and treat collectivechoice issues (Figure 7). Together they can improve our understanding of how to successfully
manage a collective-choice issue in the FBFA.
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Figure 10. 7 Key Challenges to Diagnosis and Treat Collective-choice Issues (NRC, 2002).

ANALYSIS
Polycentric Political System
In making an assessment of the FBFA, it is important to note that the collective-choice
issues come as a result of a coordination problem within a polycentric political system. A
polycentric political system is defined as a multiplicity of political stakeholders and institutions
overlapping because of jurisdiction diversity (Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren, 1961). In the FBFA the
examples of multiple jurisdictions are tribal, federal, state, and chapter governments. In a
polycentric political system, the participating parties have formal and informal decision-making
mechanisms that are independent of each other, but their actions may affect each other and
jurisdictions may overlap or be unclear. Working independently creates the coordination
problems that are typical in unresolved collective-choice issues. Is had been argued that a goal
when facing a polycentric political system is to develop a “Gargantua,” as referred to by Ostrom,
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Tiebout, and Warren (1961). A “Gargantua” is defined as a single dominant center for making
decisions (Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren, 1961). In the case of this analysis of the FBFA, a
recognized, single dominant center or organizing group for making decisions would be needed
for ensuring that newly available funding resources are used to assess and implement waterline
developments and extensions that best serve the FBFA’s forgotten people. Applying and
working through the Institutional Analysis Framework for the FBFA to help think through the
creation of such a single organizing center or group, which includes all stakeholders, which has
been missing since the thaw of 2009 when President Obama repealed the Bennett Freeze.

Institutional Analysis Framework
The data and information used in the analysis will come from historical documents, legal
documents, newspaper articles, and previous oral testimony of Former Bennett Freeze residents.
The time frame from which information will be collected is from 1868 to 2018. The data
collected will first be used in the context of the Intuitional Analysis Framework (Figure 4).
Developing an institutional analysis framework provides the general understanding of a
collective-choice issue.
In implementing the Institutional Analysis Framework, the first step will be to identify the
polycentric political system stakeholder and institutions that are key in an interdependent FBFA
single dominant center for making decisions. These stakeholder and institutions are defined as
the following:

Post-FBFA


Federal Political Jurisdictions
o Indian Health Service (IHS)
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o Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
o United States Department of Agriculture Rural Development (USDS RD)
o U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Tribal Political Jurisdictions
o Navajo Nation Council
o Navajo Nation Office of the Speaker
o Navajo Nation Executive Office
o The 9 Navajo Nations Chapter Governments located within the FBFA
 Bodaway-Gap Chapter
 Cameron Chapter
 Coalmine Chapter
 Coppermine Chapter
 Kaibito Chapter
 Leupp Chapter
 Tolani Lake Chapter
 Tonlea Chapter
 Tuba City Chapter
Tribal Non-Government Enterprise Political Jurisdictions
o Navajo Housing Authority (NHA)
o Navajo Tribal Utility Authority (NTUA)

Pre-FBFA
 Federal Political Jurisdictions
o United States President Chester Arthur
o Department of Interior
o United States Congress
o Commissioner of Indian Affairs
o United States District Court
o United States President Barrack Obama
 Tribal Political Jurisdictions
o Hopi Tribal Government
o Navajo Tribal Government
By identifying the Pre and Post –FBFA the policy decisions polycentric political
system stakeholders and institutions the action arenas are able to be structured by the collective
choice decisions, operational decisions, and constitutional decisions that affected the FBFA
historically and currently. The physical world for this analysis is referred to as the FBFA.
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Attributes of the community are all involved in the polycentric political system. Rules-in-Use
refers to the rules the “Bennett Freeze” imposed, halted concerning development, and then in the
Post-FBFA what the law repealing the Bennett Freeze created concerning development.
The action arena had three primary participants, which were the Federal government, Hopi
government, and Navajo government. The action situation in the action arena of pattern
interactions was tribal Hopi-Navajo Land Disputes. The primary outcome in the institutional
analysis framework was the development freeze of the FBFA.

Levels of Analysis for an Institutional Approach
For this particular analysis of the FBFA water resource management collective-choice
issue, the constitutional rule is not needed in the creation of the single dominant center for
making decisions on the assessment of where waterlines and extensions are most needed. The
two areas of focus for levels of analysis for an institutional approach are the collective-choice
and operational rules.
Policy-making, management, and funding as oppose to adjudication are key concerns in
the collective-choice level of analysis. After the FBFA freeze was lifted in 2009, the funding to
support development from governmental agencies began to enter into the FBFA. Legislation
from Navajo tribal leaders began to move that stated the talk was over to help the forgotten
people and the time for action was now to help the FBFA (Appendix A). The estimated
projected rehabilitation cost of the FBFA is $1.3B (Minard, 2012). Since 2012, approximately
$9,755,000 from grants, escrow funds, and matching funds have been set aside to help
rehabilitate the FBFA (NHO, 2017, 2018, 2018). Subtracting $9,755,000 from $1.3B is
$1,290,245,000. Rounding up $1,290,245,000 to the nearest hundred million the result is $1.3B.
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It is no wonder that although funding has come to the FBFA since 2009, no homes have been
published in news articles like the groundbreaking for homes sites are publicized. Homes on the
Hopi Reservation were recorded at 46.7% of homes lacked complete plumbing facilities in 1990
(Bureau of the Census, 1995). In 2016, 46.7% of homes on the Hopi Reservation were still
recorded to lack complete plumbing facilities (Ashley, 2016). The Navajo Reservation was
recorded in 1990 to have 49.1% of homes lack complete plumbing (Bureau of the Census, 1995).
Overall the United States as a nation in 1990 was recorded to have 1% of homes lacking
complete plumbing (Bureau of the Census, 1995). According to the 2000 Census, 20,188 people
live within the boundaries of the nine chapters of the FBFA (Navajo Nation Department of
Water Resources, 2011). Of the approximately 20,000 residents, 62% lack complete indoor
plumbing facilities (Navajo Nation Department of Water Resources, 2011). The FBFA in 2010
is recorded to have 62%, that is 12.9% greater than what was recorded for the homes lacking
plumbing in 1990 for the entire Reservation. It is clear that the effort to rehabilitate the FBFA
needs to be done with much efficiency to make the most out of funding that comes for
rehabilitation.
It was estimated that developing a water pipeline in the FBFA would serve four of the
nine chapters and would cost around $515 million to complete (Navajo Nation Department of
Water Resources, 2011). The Western Navajo Pipeline was designed to run from Lake Powell to
Cameron, Arizona. The Western Navajo Pipeline never moved passed the planning stage
because Congress denied S. 2109.5 Figure 8, shows the need for water supply systems in the
FBFA. As a result of coordination problems and disputes amongst the governmental parties over
5

S. 2109 was introduced to the 112th Congress on February 14, 2012 this bill died in congress
and was not enacted. No municipal water projects with water right claims were authorized to be
constructed because no agreement was made between the State of Arizona, the Hopi Tribe and
Navajo Nation.
Professional Project

34

Nikki Tulley

water rights, the FBFA is left without a major waterline. The Western Navajo Pipeline is an
excellent example of the great need to develop strong coordination between collective-choice
and operational rules. The construction of a stronger level of analysis for an institutional
approach can begin to develop with the design principles to meet challenges opposing the rules.
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Figure 11. Navajo Tribal Utility Authority Water Supply System across the Navajo Nation

FBFA
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Figure 12. Groundwater Wells across the Navajo Nation reaching the depth of the C Aquifer

FBFA

Informal and Formal Collective-choice Arenas
The FBFA and the discussion of water resource assessment is a complex issue from
which numerous collective-choice arenas come from. Since the lift of the Bennett Freeze in
2009 many organizations from national, regional and local levels have begun to brainstorm as to
how FBFA can be rehabilitated. Figure 11 is an example of documents that have been created to
outline how the organization Native Builders LLC, sees the income and outcome components of
their collective-choice arena. Native Builders LLC is an organization motivated by economic
development. The goal of economic development is to work on receiving resources. For the
FBFA Native Builders LLC has thus far created strategic plans. The plans have yet to be
implemented in the efforts of the rehabilitation of the FBFA. Like others who have tried to work
on the rehabilitation of the FBFA, plans and efforts are halted by the lack of resources to
continue the work and left at the strategic plan stage.
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Figure 13. Navajo Renaissance FBFA Illustration (Native Builders LLC, 2013).

Private associations like Native Builders have worked to create solutions of how to best
bring rehabilitation to FBFA. Many of which like Native Builders have focused heavily on the
economic and general community development. One thing to note about Figure 11 is that there
is much discussion on the development and yet there is no mention of water resource
management. More specifically there is no mention of water resource development. Native
Builders are not alone in making water development a forgotten resource, for the forgotten
people in the FBFA.
In the methodology two forms of collective-choice arenas were discussed, formal and
informal. The formal collective-choice arenas that highly influence water resources on FBFA
are displayed in Figure 12. Figure 12 sums up well the polycentric governing groups that are
mentioned when it comes to the rehabilitation of the FBFA. Using Figure 12 to discuss a formal
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collective-choice arena the formal collective-choice arena (Figure 7) can be broken down as
follows:










Legislatures
o Navajo Nation Council
o Office of the Speaker
o Office of the Navajo Nation President and Vice President
o The 9 Navajo Nation Chapters in the FBFA
Regulatory Agencies
o NTUA
o NHA
o IHS
Federal Agencies
o IHS
o BIA
o USDA RD
Operational Rules-in-Use
o Inputs
 CLUPs
 W&H Pacific Study
 Waiting Lists
 Existing Plans
 Priority Projects
o Plans
 Regional Plan
 NHA FBFA Housing Plan
 IRMP
Formal Monitoring and Enforcement Activities
o Resources
 Escrow Funding
 NHA Funds
 RCDI Grant
 Federal Grant
 Foundation Grants
o Tools
 EDSPs
 Financial Training
 IDAs
 Feasibility Studies
 Waiting Lists
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Housing Assessments
RCDI Training

It’s important to note that the FBFA Master Planning Process (Figure 12), was prepared
by a party identified as being in the informal collective-choice arena. Although considered
informal much of the same rules-in-use, incomes, outcomes, resources, and tools remain the
same. However, it is also important to know that each of these governmental, agencies,
legislatures, community members, and enterprises are all working independently without a single
unit decision making center to address the FBFA. A single unit decision making center can be
established using the FBFA Master Planning Process through designating specific individuals to
participate in the capacity as board members. Appointing an individual selected from members
of the roundtable (Figure 12) elected as the mediator will ensure matters of the FBFA are
discussed.
Working as a single decision making unit, as Native Builders LLC has tried to create, will
provide efficiency in accomplishing rehabilitation for the FBFA with fewer resources in
addressing the collective-choice issue. Developing design principles for a FBFA water
development management system will help in creating sound advice for working on the
collective-choice issue.

Professional Project

41

Nikki Tulley

Figure 14. FBFA Master Planning Process (Native Builders LLC, 2016).
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Collective-choice Design Principles and Challenges
Considerable desire to rehabilitate the FBFA exist from many different sources in the
polycentric political system. However, to this day, despite funding being marked for the FBFA
nearly all of the 20,000+ residents fall victim to lack of access to water in their homes. The
homes that lack access to water gain access to water by hauling it from water wells. When no
plumbing in the home exists residents build outhouses for bathrooms. Sinks in homes without
access to indoor plumbing use large bowls as washing basins. By developing a single collective
decision making unit based on the design principles that include all aspects of governments,
communities and values there is a greater chance of success for bringing water to FBFA
residents. The chance of success is increased by using the design principles because the
principles bring action, agreements, and accountability for specific collective-choice issues. The
specific collective-choice issue that the design principles will address is the issues of providing
access to water for the residents of the FBFA. One noteworthy benefit that will immediately
come to the FBFA water resource development through the design principles is accounting for
resources designated for rehabilitation. Table 3 starts to lay out how the eight collective-choice
design principles might apply to the FBFA rehabilitation.

Table 3
Ostrom’s Eight Collective-choice Design Principles for Resource Management
8 Principles for Managing a Collective-choice FBFA Water Development Management
System
1. Define clear group boundaries.
 The nine chapters of the FBFA.
 The Navajo people located living within the boundaries of the FBFA.
 Projects that will rehabilitate the FBFA through water resources development
(i.e. waterlines and water wells).
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2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
 Residents who have lived in the FBFA during the time of the freeze will be given
preference.
 Homes and establishments located near quality existing waterlines and wells will
be given preference.
 Alternative measures for homes of residents that were abandoned or where the
cost exceeds the cost of establishing a new home will not be given resources.
 Residential and community projects in the FBFA must comply with deadline
applications.
 By in from the resident and community must be present through active
participation in seeking rehabilitation.
 Family groups with multigenerational residents living in the FBFA will be given
preference like residence living close to existing waterlines and wells.

3. Collective-choice arrangements
 Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules.
 FBFA access to the process of rule making (i.e. non-profit organizations,
community organizations, family clans).
 Allow community experts to actively participate in establishing agreements.
 Provide participation in the decision making process from multigenerational
families living in the FBFA. The information that multigenerational families can
share is valuable to the speaking of Diné perspectives of pre-FBFA and post-FBFA
life. Multigenerational families can provide much to the topic of sustainability in
the FBFA.
 Understand that the process of making agreements may not follow the standard
agreement making process like in western thought (i.e. outline meeting
agendas). Tribal family clans in the FBFA may prefer discussion of rehabilitating
through talking in the style of having an open mic where there is no time limit
nor limit to the number of people who can talk.
 Be mindful that the discussion of water may be considered a living being by
some residents of the FBFA. And will be given the opportunity to be spoken for
by medicine people.
 Allow Diné Fundamental Law beliefs in arrangements
o Our elders and our medicine people, the teachers of traditional laws,
values and principles must always be respected and honored if the
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people and the government are to persevere and thrive.
o The teachings of the elders and medicine people, their participation in
government and their contributions of the traditional values and
principles of Diné life way will ensure growth of the FBFA.
o The elders and medicine people must be requested to provide the
cleansing, protection prayers, and blessing ceremonies necessary for
securing healthy leadership and the operation of the government in
harmony with traditional law in the FBFA.

4. Monitoring
 Make sure the rule-making rights of community members are respected by
outside authorities.
 Federal, State, Tribal, and Local governments, as well as Grassroots
Organizations should all have their voice heard in the decision making process.
 All participating parties defined by the boundaries will be given consideration in
the agreement process.

5. Graduated sanctions
 Develop a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members’
behavior.
 Report violation of participating party within the FBFA boundaries.
 Lost of priority status to gain access to resources will serve as a penalty.
 Suspension from participating in agreement discussions will serve as a penalty.
 Monetary fine based on rule broken will serve as a penalty.

6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
 Use graduated sanctions for rule violators.
 First mechanism to resolve conflict will be to follow the Diné Fundamental Law
Peacemaking procedure which takes the approach to “talk things out” before
formal graduated sanction is established.
 In relation to the Nahasdzáán dóó Yádiłhił Bitsąądęę Beenahaz'áanii--Diné
Natural Law, water all forms must be respected, honored and protected for they
sustain life. If the natural law is not followed the use of medicine people may be
called upon to restore the balance and harmony. Cost may be placed on the
party who broke the balance.
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Establish an Environmental Mediation approach with a designated mediator to
help solve disagreements in the FBFA.

7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize
 In order to limit outside governmental authority, influence the participating
parties will be limited to those who fall into the defined boundaries for the FBFA.
 Develop regional FBFA point of contacts within the nine chapter areas to discuss
collective-choice issues.
 When other governmental authorities outside the FBFA are needed for the
agreement making process self-govern rules will still stand.

8. Nested enterprises
 Build responsibility for governing the common resource in nested tiers from the
lowest level up to the entire interconnected system.
 The nested enterprise will consist of appropriation, provision, monitoring,
enforcement, conflict resolution, and governing activities.
 The nested enterprise will be defined as a single dominant center for making
decisions, known otherwise as the “gargantuan”.

With the design principles now summarized for the FBFA, alongside the interpretations
of the institutional analysis framework, levels of analysis, and collective-choice arenas there
remains only the analysis of the challenges (Figure 8) for this particular collective-choice issue.
The key challenges that are faced by this FBFA collective-choice issue are as follows:


Monitoring the resource and the resource use & Low-cost enforcement of rules
o Clearly define the boundaries of resource and user group
o Devise Rules that are congruent with local conditions
o Hold monitors accountable to resource users
o Devise rules that are congruent with local conditions
o Apply graduated sanctions for violations
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Reconciling conflicts; Coping with imperfect knowledge of the resource system;
Establishing linkages across space and scale; Adapting to change
o Establish/use low-cost mechanisms for conflict resolution
o Use nested layers of organization to govern large systems combined into a single
unit, referred to as a “Gargantua”.
o Allow most resource users to participate in devising rules

This analysis focuses on six of the challenges that are linked to the design principles. The
challenges are separated into two main categories. One category focuses on monitoring and
enforcement of rules. The other category focuses on conflicts and change. Up until this point in
the literature western perspectives have been applied to the FBFA. And currently, the FBFA
continues to struggle to rehabilitate and find prosperity despite having the developmental freeze
lifted. Table 4 shows the up-to-date institutional performance of the FBFA based on the
collective-choice design principles. Overall the institutional performance of the FBFA is failing.

Table 4
Ostrom’s Eight Collective-choice Design Principles for Resource Management and Institutional
Performances applied to the FBFA (Ostrom, 1990).
Site: FBFA
Applied

Clearly define boundaries
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local
conditions
Collective-choice arrangements
Monitoring
Graduated sanctions
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
Minimal recognition of rights to organize
Nested enterprises
Total Number of Principles currently applied to the FBFA
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Applied

√
√
√

1

√
√
√
√
√
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It is speculated that the overall failure could be partially attributed to the funds coming to
the Navajo Nation are continuously in high demand to address the needs of all 110 chapters, and
not just the nine chapters located in the FBFA. Resources used to develop economic growth of
the overall Navajo Nation can also be speculated to also take precedence over the FBFA. The
entire Navajo Nation continues to face persistent poverty, and struggles economically and in
providing basic public services for the entire reservation. Therefore, although there was an
extreme injustice, which the FBFA residences endured with a developmental freeze the
opportunity to rehabilitate may have to start at the local level to bring change to the entire FBFA.
Starting from individual chapter houses developing a single decision-making unit would
best be advised to include Diné (Navajo) perspectives to the design principles and challenges in
the institutional analysis framework. Up until this point, the polycentric political system in
addressing the FBFA rehabilitation has relied solely based on a western perspective. However,
including Diné perspectives (Figure 13) that reach in time far back beyond the 1966 Bennett
Freeze, before western governments came to the area, and back to a time when local people
worked at self-governance and sustainability will provide great insight as to sharing successful
ideas for rehabilitation.
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Reconciling conflicts

K'é

Coping with imperfect
knowledge of the
resource system

Diné
Bi Beenahaz'áanii

Diné Perspectives
Establishing linkages
across space and scale

Adapting to change

Diné Bi

Beehaz'áanii
Bitse Siléí
Ndaanit'áii or
Naat'aanii

Figure 15. Diné Perspectives on Four of the Seven Challenges Relating to Design Principles.

The Navajo Nation government was formulated with the intention of Navajos living like
mainstream American citizens. Tribal governments are still fairly new to tribal people.
Traditional Law has been known to tribal people much longer. Therefore, it is appropriate to
include Diné perspectives to rehabilitating an area that has endured suffering for decades as a
result of a new governing system. Figure 16 is an example of the original Diné Law Structure
used to govern Diné people.
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Figure 16. Diné Original Law Structure (Navajo Nation Council, 2002).

First, with the respect to reconciling conflict, the idea of K’é surrounds the concept that
all are related. Being all are related and all one family carries the mentality that issues of conflict
need to be resolved because there is the notion that one singular family unit exists. And in that
family unit needs to exist harmony. Harmony will only exist when conflict is resolved and
balance is restored. Resolving conflict through Ke’é is a peacemaking process in which much
discussion takes place believing that “talking it out” will resolve the issue.
Second, with respect to dealing with imperfect knowledge, Diné Bi Beenahaz'áanii as a
concept can be translated into English from Navajo as meaning, it is because of it, it exists
because of the law. In this particular analysis, Diné Bi Beenahaz'áanii is referring to the act of
rehabilitating the FBFA. However, the act of rehabilitation when working with Diné Bi
Beenahaz'áanii does not only include our current human living world. Diné Bi Beenahaz'áanii
includes all aspects of the original law structure that the Diné came with since the time of their
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creation stories. The foundation of the Diné Bi Beenahaz'áanii is that the Diné are the image of
their ancestors and that are created in connection with all creation (Navajo Nation Council,
2002). The challenge of coping with imperfect knowledge of the resource system fits perfectly
within Diné Bi Beenahaz'áanii. Because through that acknowledgement of imperfection comes
the answer of conflict issues being found not only in one law, but four laws of Diné Bi
Beenahaz'áanii.
Third, Diné Bi Beehaz'áanii Bitse Siléí is the foundation of Diné Law. Diné Bi
Beehaz'áanii Bitse Siléí carries the meaning that it is ordained by the Holy People. Holy People
to the Diné are individuals who have been present since the creation and will remain present,
their purpose is to keep harmony and balance. Harmony and balance is referred to as hozho. If
hozho does not exist, then conflict will. Through Diné Bi Beehaz'áanii Bitse Siléí linkages
across space and scale are established. Diné Bi Beehaz'áanii Bitse Siléí brings together the four
laws of Diné Bi Beenahaz'áanii that sorts out the imperfect knowledge of the resource system.
The four laws of Diné Bi Beenahaz'áanii are: Diyin Bitsąądęę Beenahaz'áanii, Diyin
Dine'é Bitsąądęę Beenahaz'áanii, Nahasdzáán dóó Yádiłhił Bitsąądęę Beenahaz'áanii, and Diyin
Nohookáá Diné bi beenahaz'áanii. Diyin Bitsąądęę Beenahaz'áanii is the Traditional Law. Diyin
Dine'é Bitsąądęę Beenahaz'áanii is the Customary Law. Nahasdzáán
dóó Yádiłhił Bitsąądęę Beenahaz'áanii is the Natural Law. And Diyin Nohookáá Diné bi
beenahaz'áanii is the Common Law. In this analysis there are particular parts from each of the
four laws that combine with Ostrom’s design principles to meet the challenges that the FBFA
faces with this analysis’ collective-choice issue.
The keystone that is missing in current solutions to rehabilitating the FBFA through water
resource development is a Nahasdzáán dóó Yádiłhił Bitsąądęę Beenahaz'áanii –Natural Law
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concept. That Natural Law concept is that there are four sacred elements of life, air, light/fire,
water, and earth/pollen (Navajo Nation Council, 2002). Those sacred elements in all their forms
must be respected, honored and protected for they sustain life. When the sacred elements are
respected, honored and protected sustainability is believed to return. Water is one of the key
sacred elements at the focus of this analysis. Through the acknowledgement of the Natural Law
and the sacredness water holds to bring rehabilitation to the FBFA is no longer a technical issue
of waterline assessment, but one of restoring hozho (balance and harmony). The restoring of
hozho then includes the other three Diné laws. The traditional value system and belief relating to
water resources specifically is that the water is living. The water has special names, prayers and
songs tied to the land, people and language. From Diné perspectives the names, prayers, songs,
land, people, and language are a law. The Diné perspectives could be the missing keystone thus
far that has not ben considered to brining full rehabilitation back to the FBFA via water resource
development. Through Ostrom’s design principles Diné perspectives will be given
consideration.
None of the Diné perspectives have any mention of economic resources. Because there is
no mention of monetary resources combining Diné perspectives with western perspective in the
challenges and design principles have a greater chance of gaining successful momentum to
develop a single decision making unit. The single decision making unit will allow the FBFA to
work together to indicate the areas to be rehabilitated through water access based on the
established design principles.

DISCUSSION
The title of this professional project is Providing Water for a Forgotten People:
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A Waterline Assessment of the Former Bennett Freeze Area. The title could easily be changed
to Providing a Forgotten Resource for a Forgotten People: A Waterline Assessment of the
Former Bennett Freeze Area. It’s no surprise that water would be a forgotten resource in the
FBFA considering the Navajo Nation government was established to help meet the American oil
companies with their desires to lease reservation land (Navajo Nation Government, 2018), much
of that land being located in western Navajo (Appendix B). After the developmental freeze in
the FBFA was lifted the three top priorities of funding coming to the area are geared towards
economic development, housing, and health. Although economic development, housing, and
health all connect to water the specific mention of water development is left from the discussion.
The desired general outcome of this research was to assess water resource development in
the FBFA. The assessment was done using Ostrom’s Eight Design Principles for Commons
Management. Through an institutional analysis of the FBFA a suggestion was given as how to
successfully manage the collective-choice issue brought on by coordination problems using
Ostrom’s work.
Not only is there the importance of creating stronger sustainable foundations for decision
making in the FBFA there is a need to heal and generate stronger relations in conflict resolution.
Environmental mediation is a way to address the conflicts that persist in the FBFA.
Environmental mediation includes a mediator that will direct the discussion of viewpoint sharing
and identifying issues of the conflicts within the FBFA. The mediator will be required to be a
resident or have community ties to one of the nine chapters in the FBFA. The mediator will be
elected by residents living in the areas of the nine chapters of the FBFA. Election of the role of
mediator will be put on the tribal election ballots for these nine chapters. The mediator will not
have the power to serve as a judge, jury or arbitrator. Rather the mediator has the role of leading
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the environmental mediation session as an expert of the FBFA water policy. The participating
parties involved in the environmental mediation have the authority to resolve issues in the FBFA.
The outcome goal of the environmental mediation will be to reach an agreement of participating
parties. The agreement of participating parties will have to receive support of the majority. The
majority will be considered as approval from ¾ of all participating parties. The environmental
mediator will draft up the agreements and plans of action. The agreements and plans of actions
will indicate where incoming resources will fund projects in the FBFA.
Being inclusive in environmental mediation includes the public interest. The broader
public interest comprises looking outside narrowly defined thoughts, roles, and interests.
Looking outside defined views forces the inclusion of perspectives from stakeholders who might
be left out of water resource analysis within the FBFA. An example of tribal participation in
environmental mediation that included public interest can be found in Idaho. Coeur d’Alene
Lake Management Plan Mediation is a successful example of what environmental mediation is
capable of when polycentric political systems resolve conflicts with a mediator. In 2005 the U.S.
Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution joined the efforts of three other stakeholders and
institutions to resolve conflict over the water quality of Coeur d’Alene Lake (Udall Foundation).
Through environmental mediation an extensive assessment was done to identify the core
problem and what the particular points of contention were. The mediator served as the focal
contact person to hear all parties and record the interviews, which were later combined into a
report and distributed to participating parties for further input. Once input from participating
parties were gathered a final assessment was made that included options and recommendations
on the plan of action to resolve the problem. In the final assessment stage the mediator help to
conduct the conflict resolution process that also included public input. During the conflict
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resolution process agreements were made on the implementation of the plan and how funding
would be used for the Coeur d’Alene Lake Management Plan Mediation. The result of the final
assessment was the signing of the Lake Management Plan in 2009 that controlled the project
work plans and resources to address the lake water quality issues. The inclusion of diverse
perspectives like in the case of the Coeur d’Alene, in making water policy to manage the
collective-choice for the FBFA successfully will surely make a different impact than what
conflict and dispute created with the initial freeze.
The recommendation to prevent an event like the 1966 Bennett Freeze and the decades
that followed that event, is to set up procedures that work towards conflict resolution
continuously. Conflict-resolution can be maintained by using the outcome of Ostrom’s work as
it is applied to the FBFA. The collective choice and operational choice level of analysis provide
processes that streamline the design principles to address conflict resolution by following the
good general advice for sustainably managing the water resource management. The inclusion of
Diné perspectives as a part of this FBFA research to assess water resource development became
an example of a decolonizing approach with the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge.6
Including Diné (Indigenous) perspectives in this FBFA analysis is an approach that has
not been considered thus far with the rehabilitation efforts made by stakeholder and institutions.
The inclusion of Indigenous knowledge approach is key to establishing water resource
management sustainability. The use of Indigenous perspectives provides the opportunity to use
forms of rules and regulations that go beyond the establishment of the FBFA and western

6

The definition of decolonizing research is the act of exploring, valuing and using Indigenous
knowledge within Indigenous communities providing a space and voice justifying the valid
points that can be made in resolving conflicts (Simonds and Christopher, 2013).
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governments. Using the four laws of Diné Bi Beenahaz'áanii and Ke’é interchangeably with
Ostrom’s design principles creates the foundation for decolonizing approaches to resolve water
resource management in the FBFA. It is through the decolonizing approach of including
Indigenous perspectives with western perspectives that water resource management in the FBFA
has greater chance for success.
Future work, relating to this analysis of the FBFA will be to apply the outcome of the
evaluation criteria to a geographic information system (GIS) evaluation. The information
provided by the institutional analysis will be used to pinpoint exact locations through the use of
GIS. Pinpointing location buffers within the FBFA will allow more efficient use of time and
resources. An analysis of where to extend and develop waterlines in the FBFA will help the
process of getting water to residents. Being efficient with time and resources will make the most
significant impact on the rehabilitation efforts in the FBFA. Successfully managing the
collective-choice issue brought on by previous coordination problems with the use of GIS and
Ostrom’s Design Principles will ensure the residents of the FBFA do not remain a Forgotten
People.
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